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Abstract
We determine the endogenous order of moves in which the firms set their prices
in the framework of a capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly. A three-
period timing game that determines the period in which the firms announce their
prices precedes the price-setting stage. We show for the non-trivial case (in which
the Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly has only an equilibrium in non-degenerated mixed-
strategies) that the firm with the largest capacity sets its price first, while the two other
firms set their prices later. Our result extends a finding by Deneckere and Kovenock
(1992) from duopolies to triopolies. This extension was made possible by Hirata’s
(2009) recent advancements on the mixed-strategy equilibria of Bertrand-Edgeworth
games.
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1 Introduction
A challenging question for oligopoly theory and its applications is the determination of the
right order of moves because this influences the market structure and its equilibrium be-
havior. In this paper we address the timing problem for price-setting games, in particular,
within the framework of a homogenous good capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth
triopoly. The key feature of these price-setting games is that the firms may serve less than
the demand they are facing. The main difficulty with these models is that one has to con-
sider mixed-strategy equilibria since for the interesting cases there is a lack of equilibrium
in pure strategies.1
Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) determined the endogenous order of decisions in a
homogeneous good Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game with capacity constraints. Their
∗Financial support from the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA K-101224) is gratefully ac-
knowledged.
†Fo˝va´m te´r 8, 1093 Budapest, Hungary (e-mail: attila.tasnadi@uni-corvinus.hu)
1For more on Bertrand-Edgeworth games the reader is referred to Vives (1999).
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result was partially generalized from duopolies to oligopolies by Gangopadhyay (1993)
who compared the simultaneous-move case with the purely sequential move case, which
still did not determine the endogenous order of moves for the oligopolistic case. The
main difficulty in solving the timing problem lies in the difficulty of handling the mixed-
strategy equilibrium in Bertrand-Edgeworth games. Beckmann (1965), Levitan and Shubik
(1972) Vives (1986) and Cheviakov and Hartwick (2005) determined the mixed-strategy
equilbrium solutions under quite restrictive assumptions such as linear demand or identical
firms. Under more general conditions the mixed-strategy equilibrium has been given in non-
closed form by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), Davidson and Deneckere (1986), Osborne
and Pitchik (1986) and Allen and Hellwig (1993) in the duopolistic setting.
The investigation of the triopolistic timing game has been made possible by recent
characterizations of the mixed-strategy equilibrium of capacity-constrained Bertrand-
Edgeworth triopolies by Hirata (2009) and independently by De Francesco and Salvadori
(2010). Based on their characterizations we find that the large-capacity firm will emerge
as the endogenous price leader, which extends a result on the duopolistic case obtained by
Deneckere and Kovenock (1992). Timing of decisions within the price-setting framework
usually results in known forms of price leadership, and therefore, we will also relate our
results to the dominant firm model of price leadership.
In general, there is a growing literature on endogenous timing of decisions in oligopolies
both in the price-setting and the quantity-setting framework. The first contributions in this
direction were made by Gal-Or (1985), Dowrick (1986) and Boyer and Moreaux (1987) in
works that compared the outcomes of exogenous timing duopoly games in order to find out
whether the leader or the follower has a more advantageous position. The recent literature
aims to solve the conflict concerning roles, and determines an endogenous order of moves
under certain circumstances. Just to mention some important works from the large number
of contributions we refer to Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Deneckere and Kovenock (1992),
van Damme and Hurkens (1999, 2004), Matsumura (1999, 2002), Dastidar and Furth
(2005), Yano and Komatsubara (2006, 2012) and von Stengel (2010).
It is worthwile mentioning that another strand of the literature aims to generalize
results from the Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game with deterministic demand to the
case of demand uncertainty. For noteable results in this direction we refer to Hviid (1991),
Reynolds and Wilson (2000), de Frutos and Fabra (2011) and Lepore (2012).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our framework
and an important Lemma. Section 3 considers price-setting games with exogenously given
orderings of moves. Section 4 determines the solution of our three-period timing game.
Finally, Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Framework and preliminary result
Suppose that there are three firms on the market, where we shall denote the set of firms by
N = {1, 2, 3}. We assume that the firms have zero unit costs2 up to some positive capacity
constraints. We shall denote by ki the capacity constraint of firm i and by K =
∑3
i=1 ki the
aggregate capacity of the firms. Let the capacity constraints be ordered decreasingly and
in order to reduce the number of cases we also assume that the two firms with the smaller
2Since we are considering the production-to-order version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game (that is,
production takes place after the firms’ prices are revealed), the real assumption here is that the firms have
identical unit costs.
2
capacities have identical capacities, i.e. k1 > k2 = k3. We summarize the assumptions
imposed on the triopolists’ cost functions below:
Assumption 1. There are three firms on the market with zero unit costs and capacity
constraints k1 > k2 = k3 > 0.
We refer to firm 1 as the large firm and to firms 2 and 3 as the small firms. The demand
is given by function D on which we impose the following restrictions:
Assumption 2. The demand function D intersects the horizontal axis at quantity a
and the vertical axis at price b. D is strictly decreasing, concave and twice continuously
differentiable on (0, b); moreover, D is right-continuous at 0, left-continuous at b and
D(p) = 0 for all p ≥ b.
Clearly, any price-setting firm will not set its price above b. Let us denote by P the
inverse demand function. Thus, P (q) = D−1 (q) for 0 < q ≤ a, P (0) = b, and P (q) = 0
for q > a. In addition, we shall denote by pc the market clearing price, i.e. pc = P (K).
Furthermore, we ensure that every firm will be active on the market by the next
assumption:
Assumption 3. We assume that K − k3 < a.
Let pi ∈ [0, b] be the price decision of firm i ∈ N and ti ∈ {1, 2, 3} be the time period in
which firm i annonces its price. In the first stage firms choose a time period for announcing
their prices and in the second stage firms set their prices (already knowing in which period
their opponents set their prices). The market opens after all firms have set their prices.
This type of timing game is referred to as a timing game with observable delay (Hamilton
and Slutsky, 1990). Of course, three periods are necessary and sufficient to allow for all
possible orderings of moves in case of a triopoly.3
We have to specify a demand-allocating mechanism as a function of price and timing
decisions made by the firms. In case of price ties we will assume that the demand is
allocated first to firms announcing their prices in an earlier time period. This distinction
ensures that we do not have to consider followers slightly undercutting the earlier movers’
prices. Otherwise, the subgames will not always have an equilibrium and we would need to
investigate ε-equilibrum solutions. Hence, assuming efficient rationing of consumers, the
demand faced by a price-setting firm i ∈ N is given by
∆i (t,p) =
D (pi)− ∑
j∈N,pj<pi
kj −
∑
j∈N,pj=pi,tj<ti
kj
+ ki∑
j∈N,pj=pi,tj=ti kj
.
Thus, firm i ∈ N makes pii (t,p) = pi min {ki,∆i (t,p)} profit.
We shall denote by pmi the unique revenue maximizing price on the residual demand
curve Dri (p) = (D(p)−K + ki)+ and by qmi the corresponding unique revenue maximizing
output on the inverse residual demand curve P ri , i.e. p
m
i = arg maxp∈[0,b] pD
r
i (p) and
qmi = arg maxq∈[0,a] qP
r
i (q) for any i ∈ N . Of course, qmi = Dri (pmi ). Clearly, pc and pmi
are well defined whenever Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied. Furthermore, it can be checked
that pm1 > p
m
2 = p
m
3 because of Assumptions 1-3. Let pii = pi
r
i (p
m
i ), where pi
r
i (p) = pD
r
i (p).
Note that Assumption 3 also ensures that pmi > 0 and pii > 0.
3The special triopolistic case of only two possible periods has been considered in Tasna´di (2010). How-
ever, at least three periods are needed to allow for the emergence of all possible orderings.
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If ki ≤ qmi , then we will say that firm i ∈ N has scarce capacity, while otherwise we
will say that firm i ∈ N has sufficient capacity. Note that a firm with scarce capacity
will be eager to produce at its capacity limit. It can be verified that condition ki ≤ qmi
is equivalent to pc ≥ pmi . Let us denote by pdi ∈ [0, pmi ] the smallest price for which
pdi min{ki, D
(
pdi
)} = pmi Dri (pmi ) whenever this equation has a solution, which is the case,
for instance, if firm i has sufficient capacity (implying pc < pdi < p
m
i ). At price p
d
i firm i is
indifferent to whether serving residual demand at price level pmi or selling min{ki, D
(
pdi
)}
at the lower price level pdi . We will need the following Lemma established for the two firm
case by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) and stated by Hirata (2009) for the triopolistic
case.
Lemma 1. Suppose that firm i and j have both sufficient capacity and that Assumptions
1, 2 and 3 are satisfied. If i < j, then pdi ≥ pdj . In addition, if ki > kj, then pdi > pdj .
3 Exogenously given order of moves
In this section we investigate a variation of the capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth
game with three firms in which the firms can announce their price decisions in one of
three subsequent periods. The two-stage game with just two firms has been investigated
by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992). They found for the duopolistic case with identical unit
costs that the large capacity firm moves first, while the small capacity firm second.4 Re-
cent characterizations of the mixed-strategy equilibrium of capacity-constrained Bertrand-
Edgeworth oligopolies by Hirata (2009) and by De Francesco and Salvadori (2010) make it
possible to extend Deneckere’s and Kovenock’s (1992) result from duopolies to triopolies.
Taking Assumption 1 and that the firms can set their prices in three periods into
consideration, we have to investigate six different games with exogenously given orderings
of moves:
(i) The large firm is the single exogenously given first mover,
(ii) the large firm is the single exogenously given last mover,
(iii) one of the small firms is the single exogenously given first mover and the other two
firms move simultaneously,
(iv) one of the small firms is the single exogenously given final mover and the other two
firms move simultaneously,
(v) a small firm is the exogenously given first mover, the large firm the exogenously given
second mover and the other small firm the exogenously given third mover,
(vi) the three firms move in the same period.
Case (vi) leads to the simultaneous-move price-setting game analyzed by Hirata (2009)
and De Francesco and Salvadori (2010). If the simultaneous-move game has an equilibrium
in pure strategies, then we know that firms make either zero profits or produce all at their
capacity limits in a pure-strategy equilibrium, in which case it can be checked that for
any ordering of moves we will have the same outcome in cases (i)-(vi). Hence, the timing
game is only of real interest if the simultaneous-move price-setting game does not have an
equilibrium in pure strategies, i.e Assumption 4 is satisfied.
4They also investigated the case of different unit costs.
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Assumption 4. pm1 > p
c.
We know from Hirata (2009) and De Francesco and Salvadori (2010) for case (vi) that
firm 1’s expected profit equals pi1, while firm 2’s and 3’s expected profits equal p
d
1k2 = p
d
1k3
under our assumptions. We will treat cases (i)-(v) in separate propositions.
Proposition 1. Under efficient rationing and Assumptions 1-4 if the large firm is the ex-
ogenously given first mover, then the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium prices and profits
are given by
(p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) = (p
m
1 , p
m
1 , p
m
1 ) and (pi
∗
1, pi
∗
2, pi
∗
3) = (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
m
1 k3).
Proof. Clearly, firm 1 sets price p1 ∈ [pd1, b). Suppose that pi > p1 for at least one small firm
i ∈ {2, 3}. If pi > pj , where j denotes the other small firm (i 6= j and i, j ∈ {2, 3}), then
firm i would not earn more profit than pii = p
d
i ki, which is less than p
d
1ki ≤ p1ki. Hence,
firm i would benefit from switching to price p1. Switching to price p1 is also beneficial
if p2 = p3 > p1 and the small firms do not sell anything at all. If the small firms face
positive residual demand at price p2 = p3 > p1 and the small firms are moving in the
same period, then both small firms would benefit from unilaterally undercutting the other
small firm’s price. If the small firms face positive residual demand at price p2 = p3 > p1
and the small firms move in different periods, then the first moving small firm would serve
residual demand, and therefore it would be better of by setting price p1.
From the previous paragraph we know that the small firms do not set prices above p1,
and therefore the large firm faces residual demand at price p1. Hence, by maximizing profits
with respect to its residual demand curce it sets price pm1 . Therefore, in any possible pure-
strategy equilibrium the small firms match the large firm’s price,5 i.e p2 = p3 = p1, and it
can be checked that this price profile corresponds to an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proposition 1 delivers a partial game-theoretic microfoundation of Forchheimer’s model
of dominant firm price leadership in case of a special exogenously given ordering of moves.
We will see later that the ordering assumed in Proposition 1 can be endogenized.
Turning to case (ii) in which the large firm is the sole last mover, we will see that
if the large firm is indifferent between matching a small firm’s price or serving residual
demand, then in a subgame-perfect equilibrium it has to serve residual demand, and
thus sets a higher price than the small firms. As it will be evident from the proof of
Proposition 2, the definition of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium implies that this
can be the only possible response of the large firm although the small firms cannot enforce
in stage two that the large firm will not match their price. Anyway to overcome this
kind of uncertainty the small firms could enforce an outcome close to the one stated in
Proposition 2 by setting a slightly lower price than either pd1 or p
u
1 , where p
u
1 ∈ (pd1, pm1 ] is
defined by pu1 min
{
k1, (D (p
u
1)− k2)+
}
= pi1.
6 This latter defensive behavior would result
in an ε-equilibrium on the market.
Proposition 2. Under efficient rationing and Assumptions 1-4 if the large firm is the
exogenously given sole last mover, we have to distinguish between the two main cases
specified below.
5More precisely, this holds true unless p1 > P (k2 + k3). However, firm 1 will definitely not set a price
above P (k2 + k3) since then the small-capacity firms will not set a price higher than p1, and thus, firm 1
will not sell anything at all.
6Price pu1 can be interpreted as the price at which the large-capacity firm is indifferent between serving
residual demand or being undercut by only one small-capacity firm.
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1. If k1 ≤ D(pd1)− k2, then the subgame-perfect equilibrium prices and profits are given
by
(p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) = (p
m
1 , p
d
1, p
d
1) and (pi
∗
1, pi
∗
2, pi
∗
3) = (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3)
for any ordering of moves of the small firms.
2. If k1 > D
(
pd1
)− k2 and
(a) the small firms are moving simultaneously, then we have two possible subgame-
perfect equilibria with associated equilibrium prices and profits given by
(p∗1, p∗2, p∗3) = (pm1 , pd1, pu1) and (pi∗1, pi∗2, pi∗3) = (pi1, pd1k2, pu1k3), and
(p∗1, p∗2, p∗3) = (pm1 , pu1 , pd1) and (pi∗1, pi∗2, pi∗3) = (pi1, pu1k2, pd1k3);
(b) firm 2 is the sole first mover, then the subgame-perfect equilibrium prices and
profits are given by
(p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) = (p
m
1 , p
u
1 , p
d
1) and (pi
∗
1, pi
∗
2, pi
∗
3) = (pi1, p
u
1k2, p
d
1k3);
(c) firm 3 is the sole first mover, then the subgame-perfect equilibrium prices and
profits are given by
(p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) = (p
m
1 , p
d
1, p
u
1) and (pi
∗
1, pi
∗
2, pi
∗
3) = (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
u
1k3).
Proof. Since firm 1 never sets a price below pd1, the lowest price firms 2 and 3 might set in
an equilibrium is pd1. Observe that in a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium at least
one of the two small firms must set price pd1, since otherwise firm 1 will not set a higher
price than the larger one of the two small firms’ prices, and therefore either the small firm
setting the highest price would benefit from switching to price pd1 or one of the small firms
could benefit from a unilateral price decrease.
Suppose in case of k1 < D(p
d
1) − ki that small firm i sets price pd1, while the other
small firm j sets a price pj above p
d
1. Then firm 1 would be better off by setting a price
beween pd1 and pj , since at prices slightly higher than p
d
1 (but lower than pj) it can sell its
entire capacity and make more profits than pi1. Thus, firm j makes pi
r
j (pj) profits, which
is less than pd1kj ; a contradiction. Hence, in case of k1 < D(p
d
1) − ki the two small firms
set price pd1 if their are moving simultaneously or sequentially before the large firm, which
sets price pm1 .
In contrast to the previous case in case of k1 ≥ D(pd1) − ki firm j could set its
first-stage price to pu1 because maximizing profits with respect to the demand function
D(p) − ki within interval
[
pd1, p
u
1
]
would not result in higher profits than pi1 for the
large firm. However, it has to be verified that there exists a value pu1 ∈
[
pd1, p
m
1
)
sat-
isfying pu1 min
{
k1, (D (p
u
1)− k2)+
}
= pi1. Let f(p) = pmin
{
k1, (D (p)− k2)+
}
. Since
k1 ≥ D(pd1) − ki it can be verified that f(pd1) ≤ pi1 = pd1 min
{
k1, D
(
pd1
)}
, f ′(p) > 0 on[
pd1, p
m
1
]
and f(pm1 ) > pi1 = p
m
1 min
{
k1, (D (p
m
1 )− k2 − k3)+
}
. Hence, there exists a unique
pu1 ∈
[
pd1, p
m
1
]
satisfying f(pu1) = pi1. Obsevere that p
u
1 = p
d
1 if and only if k1 = D(p
d
1)− ki,
and therefore in this special case the two small firms will set both price pd1. We conclude
that in case of k1 > D(p
d
1)−ki we obtain two asymmetric subgame-perfect equilibria if the
two small firms move simultaneously and one subgame-perfect equilibrium if the two small
firms move sequentially. It can be checked that the resulting strategy profiles determine
the pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria stated in the proposition.
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The result of Proposition 2 is analogous to case (c) of Theorem 3 in Deneckere and
Kovenock (1992) in the sense that the small firms set low prices so that they will not be
undercut by the large firm.
We continue our analysis with investigating the case in which a small firm’s move is
followed by a simultaneous move of the large firm and the other small firm.
Proposition 3. Under efficient rationing and Assumptions 1-4 if one of the small firms,
say firm 3, is the exogenously given first mover and the other two firms move simultane-
ously, then the subgame-perfect equilibrium prices and expected profits are given in case of
k1 ≤ D(pd1)− k2 by
(p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) = (X
∗
1 , X
∗
2 , p
d
1) and (Epi
∗
1, Epi
∗
2, pi
∗
3) = (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3),
and in case of k1 > D(p
d
1)− k2 by
(p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) = (X
∗
1 , X
∗
2 , p
d
1) and (Epi
∗
1, Epi
∗
2, pi
∗
3) = (pi1, p
u
1k2, p
d
1k3),
where the independent random variables X∗1 , X∗2 describing the prices set by firms 1 and 2
are distributed according to the mixed-strategy profile (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2), which constitutes a mixed-
strategy equilibrium of a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game with demand function (D(p)−
k3)
+.7
Proof. By the exogenously given ordering of moves firm 3 sets price p3 ∈ [0, b] in stage
1, and thereafter, firms 1 and 2 play a simultaneous-move Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly
game with respect to the demand function
D˜(p) =
{
(D(p)− k3)+ if p > p3 and
D(p) if p ≤ p3,
which is discontinuous at p3 if p3 ∈ [0, b). The subgame has an equilibrium (ϕ1, ϕ2) in
mixed strategies by Osborne and Pitchik (1986).8 Let pi = sup supp(ϕi) and pi = inf
supp(ϕi) for each i ∈ {1, 2}.
Since any price p1 < p
d
1 is dominated by price p
m
1 for firm 1 we must have p1 ≥ pd1.
Hence, firm 3 will not set its price p3 below p
d
1 in a subgame-perfect equilibrium in stage
1, because otherwise it would be better off by setting a price between p3 and p
d
1.
Assume that p3 ≥ pm1 . Suppose that p1 > p3 or p2 > p3 for which case we consider
two subcases. First, if pi > pj , where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j, then firm i’s expected profit
equals piri (pi), which is less than pi
r
i (p
m
i ), and therefore pi > pj cannot be the case. Second,
suppose that p1 = p2. Observe that both equilibrium strategies ϕ1 and ϕ2 cannot have an
atom at price p1 = p2, since otherwise both firms could benefit from unilaterally shifting
the probability mass from price p1 = p2 to a price slightly below p1 = p2. Thus, we see that
the strategy of at most one firm, say firm i ∈ {1, 2}, can have an atom at price p1 = p2,
and therefore its expected profit equals piri (pi) < pi
r
i (p
m
i ). Hence, p1 = p2 > p3 cannot
be the case if (ϕ1, ϕ2) is an equilibrium of the subgame. So far we obtained that in case
of p3 ≥ pm1 we must have p1 ≤ p3 and p2 ≤ p3. However, then firm 3 serves its residual
7Henceforth in this section, we emphasize that we have determined the firms’ nondeterministic expected
profits by writing Epii, whereas we simply write pii if profits are deterministic.
8Osborne and Pitchik (1986) mention the case of discontinuous, but left-continuous demand functions in
Section 5. For recent advancements on the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly
game we refer to Bagh (2010).
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demand Dr3(p3), which is strictly dominated by a price p
d
1−ε for a sufficiently small ε > 0.
Therefore, firm 3 never sets a price greater than or equal to pm1 .
We have already shown that in the first stage firm 3 selects a price from interval [pd1, p
m
1 ).
Assume that firm 3 sets price p3 = p
d
1. In determining the equilibrium of the subgame, we
consider the modified Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game with capacity constraints k1 >
k2 and demand function (D−k3)+, which by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992, Theorem 1)
has a unique equilibrium in non-degenerate mixed strategies for which [p
1
, p1] = [p2, p2] =
[pd1, p
m
1 ] if k1 ≤ D(pd1)− k2, and [p1, p1] = [p2, p2] = [pu1 , pm1 ] if k1 > D(pd1)− k2. Moreover,
the expected profits of firms 1 and 2 equal pi1 and p2k2, respectively. In addition, only price
pm1 is played with positive probability by firm 1. Since (D − k3)+ = D˜ for prices greater
than pd1, price p
d
1 will be played with probability zero and the second movers cannot achieve
higher profits by unilaterally switching to price pd1, the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the
modified game will also be a mixed-strategy equilibrium of our subgame.9 Moreover, it
has to be the unique equilibrium of the subgame by the way how the mixed-strategy
equilibrium has to be calculated.10
Finally, we turn to the case of p3 ∈
(
pd1, p
m
1
)
. Suppose that firm 3 can achieve a higher
profit by setting price p3 ∈
(
pd1, p
m
1
)
than by setting price pd1, where the latter price results
in pd1k3 profits. We divide our analysis into two subcases: (a) p1 > p3 and (b) p1 ≤ p3.
In Subcase (a) we must have p2 ≤ p1, since otherwise pi2(ϕ1, p2, p3) = pir2(p2) ≤ pir2(pm2 ) =
pd2k2 < p
d
1k2, which cannot be the case in an equilibrium. Therefore, it follows that p1 = p
m
1 ,
which in turn implies that we cannot have p
2
> pd1, since otherwise firm 1 would benefit
from switching to p1 ∈ (pd1,min{p2, p3}) from ϕ1. Hence, we must have p2 = pd1, and thus
p
1
= pd1. Employing our assumption that firm 3 is better off by setting a price above p
d
1
than by setting price pd1, we obtain that pi3(ϕ1, ϕ2, p3) > p
d
1k3 = p
d
1k2 = pi2(ϕ1, ϕ2, p3).
11
However, pi2(ϕ1, p3, p3) ≥ pi3(ϕ1, ϕ2, p3) > pi2(ϕ1, ϕ2, p3), where the first inequality follows
from the tie-breaking rule, is in contradiction with (ϕ1, ϕ2) constituting an equilibrium
of the subgame. This means that in Subcase (a) firm 3 sets price pd1. Turning to Subcase
(b), it can be verified that p1 ≤ p3 implies p2 ≤ p3, an therefore setting price p3 is worse
than setting price pd1 for firm 3. Concerning both subcases, we conclude that the first stage
equilibrium action of firm 3 is p∗3 = pd1.
From Proposition 3 we see that the small firm moving first has to set a lower price and
that the other small firm could be better off.
Now we shall turn to the case in which the simultaneous moves of the large firm and
a small firm is followed by the move of the other small firm.
Proposition 4. Under efficient rationing and Assumptions 1-4 if one of the small firms,
say firm 3, is the exogenously given last mover and the other two firms move simul-
taneously, then the subgame-perfect equilibrium prices and profits are given in case of
k1 ≤ D(pd1)− k2 by
(p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) = (X
∗
1 , X
∗
2 , Emax{X∗1 , X∗2}) and
(Epi∗1, Epi
∗
2, Epi
∗
3) = (pi1, p
d
1k2, Emax{X∗1 , X∗2}k3),
9Since D˜(pd1) > (D − k3)+(pd1) and k1 > (D − k3)+(pd1) in case of k1 > D(pd1) − k2, it should be
emphasized that firm 1 still makes only pi1 profit when setting price p
d
1.
10See Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), Osborne and Pitchik (1986) and Deneckere and Kovenock (1992).
11For the last equality we need that ϕ1 does not have an atom at price p
d
1, which can be shown easily
by contradiction.
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and in case of k1 > D(p
d
1)− k2 by
(p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) = (X
∗
1 , X
∗
2 , Emax{X∗1 , X∗2}) and
(Epi∗1, Epi
∗
2, Epi
∗
3) = (pi1, p
u
1k2, Emax{X∗1 , X∗2}k3),
where the independent random variables X∗1 , X∗2 describing the prices set by firms 1 and 2,
respectively, are distributed according to the mixed-strategy profile (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2), which consti-
tutes a mixed-strategy equilibrium price profile of a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game with
demand function (D(p) − k3)+. In addition, we know that pd1k3 < Emax{X∗1 , X∗2}k3 <
pm1 k3 or p
u
1k3 < Emax{X∗1 , X∗2}k3 < pm1 k3 depending on the case.
Proof. Firm 3 serves its residual demand Dr3 in stage 2 if p3 > max{p1, p2}. Since firm
1 never sets a price below pd1 and p
m
3 D
r
3(p
m
3 ) = p
d
3k3 < p
d
1k3 firm 3 never sets a price
higher than max{p1, p2}. Hence, firms 1 and 2 face demand curve (D(p) − k3)+ in stage
1. Finally, by taking the results on Bertrand-Edgeworth duopolies (e.g. Deneckere and
Kovenock, 1992) into consideration, we obtain the statements of the proposition.
Observe that the small firm being the follower is better off than the other small firm
moving simultaneously with the large firm under the Assumptions of Proposition 4.
Finally, we turn to the case in which the large firm moves between the two small firms.
Proposition 5. Under efficient rationing and Assumptions 1-4 if a small firm, say firm
3, is the exogenously given first mover, the large firm the exogenously given second mover
and the other small firm the exogenously given third mover, then we have to distinguish
between the following two cases.
1. If k1 ≤ D(pd1)− k2, then the subgame-perfect equilibrium prices and profits are given
by
(p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) = (p
m
1 , p
m
1 , p
d
1) and
(pi∗1, pi
∗
2, pi
∗
3) = (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
d
1k3).
2. If k1 > D
(
pd1
)−k2, then the subgame-perfect equilibrium prices and profits are given
by
(p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3) = (p
m
1 , p
m
1 , p
u
1) and
(pi∗1, pi
∗
2, pi
∗
3) = (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
u
1k3).
Proof. Clearly, in period 2 firm 1 will never set a price below pd1 and then the same holds
true for firm 2 because of the employed tie-breaking rule. Therefore, firm 3 will neither
set a price p3 below p
d
1, since otherwise it would be better off by setting a price between
p3 and p
d
1. For a similar reason in a subgame-perfect equilibrium firm 3 does not serve its
residual demand (which would happen if it sets one of the highest prices) since it would
be better off by setting price pd1 − ε, where ε is a sufficiently small positive value.
Observe that in a subgame-perfect equilibrium p2, the price set by firm 2, cannot be
higher than firm 1’s price because this would imply that either firm 2 or firm 3 must serve
residual remand. However, serving residual demand can be avoided by setting price pd1 in
case of firm 2 and by setting price pd1 − ε in case of firm 3, which would result in more
profits for the respective small firm. Hence, firm 1 has to serve residual demand and firm 3
sets the highest possible price in period 1, which still does not result in serving its residual
demand. Observe that therefore the same two cases as in Propositions 2-4 emerge. Thus,
firm 3 either sets price pd1 or p
u
1 , firm 1 set price p
m
1 and firm 2 follows with price p
m
1 .
9
4 Endogenous order of moves
In this section we determine the ordering in which the firms announce their price decisions.
First, the firms decide whether they make their price announcements in period 1,2 or 3.
Second, observing when the other firms have set their prices, the firms play the selected
price-setting game corresponding to cases (i)-(vi). That is, a ‘game with observable delay’
is played in the terminology of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).
Based on Tables 1 and 2, containing the equilibrium payoffs described in Propositions
1-5, we can determine the equilibrium timing decisions of the firms. The two different
tables correspond to the case distinctions made in Propositions 2-5. In both tables the
row player is firm 2, the column player is firm 3 and the three rows of each cell of the table
correspond to the respective timing decision of firm 1. In addition, Table 2 contains two
entries in some rows of some cells because Proposition 2 allows for two possible equilibria in
case of k1 > D(p
d
1)−k2. In both tables p˜ stands for the expected price of the small-capacity
firm when playing a mixed-strategy equilibrium according to Proposition 3.
Firm 2\3 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
(pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p˜k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p˜k3)
Period 1 (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
m
1 k3)
(pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3)
(pi1, p˜k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
m
1 k3) (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
m
1 k3)
Period 2 (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p˜k3)
(pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3)
(pi1, p˜k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
m
1 k3) (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
m
1 k3)
Period 3 (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p˜k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
m
1 k3)
(pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3)
Table 1: Timing in case of k1 ≤ D(pd1)− k2.
Firm 2\3 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
(pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
u
1k2, p˜k3) (pi1, p
u
1k2, p˜k3)
Period 1 (pi1, p
u
1k2, p
d
1k3),(pi1, p
d
1k2, p
u
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
u
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
m
1 k3)
(pi1, p
u
1k2, p
d
1k3),(pi1, p
d
1k2, p
u
1k3) (pi1, p
u
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
u
1k3)
(pi1, p˜k2, p
u
1k3) (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
m
1 k3) (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
m
1 k3)
Period 2 (pi1, p
u
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
u
1k2, p˜k3)
(pi1, p
d
1k2, p
u
1k3) (pi1, p
u
1k2, p
d
1k3),(pi1, p
d
1k2, p
u
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
u
1k3)
(pi1, p˜k2, p
u
1k3) (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
m
1 k3) (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
m
1 k3)
Period 3 (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p˜k2, p
u
1k3) (pi1, p
m
1 k2, p
m
1 k3)
(pi1, p
u
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
u
1k2, p
d
1k3) (pi1, p
d
1k2, p
d
1k3)
Table 2: Timing in case of k1 > D(p
d
1)− k2.
Checking both tables, we can see that firm 1 achieves the same expected profit in each
case. Studying both tables carefully, we obtain the following subgame-perfect equilibria of
the three-period timing game.
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Theorem 1. Under efficient rationing and Assumptions 1-4 the timing game, in which
the three firms can select between three periods to set their prices and thereafter (already
knowing in which period the three firms will set their prices) the firms set their prices, has
the following two types of subgame-perfect equilibria:
1. The large firm moves before the small firms and all of these solutions are payoff
equivalent.
2. (a) If k1 ≤ D(pd1)− k2, then the large firm moves (not neccesarilly alone) in the last
period.
(b) If k1 > D(p
d
1) − k2, then the large firm moves with at least another small firm
in the last period.
Based on the tables it can be checked that the two types of solutions given in Theorem 1
fully determine the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions of the three-period timing
game. Observe that the Pareto-efficient outcome would be a type 1 solution.
An extension of the model in the spirit of Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) in which
waiting is costly and the firms could choose between many time periods would result
in having the large firm as the first mover and the small firms as the second movers.
Since then the large firm maximizes profit with respect to its residual demand curve and
the small firms follow with the same price, we obtain a game-theoretic microfoundation
of the dominant firm model of price leadership based on capacity-constrained Bertrand-
Edgeworth triopolies.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we extended a result by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) from duopolies to
triopolies. Our findings strengthen their game-theoretic microfoundation of the dominant
firm model of price leadership.
The extension of our results to the general oligopolistic case seems to be still out of
reach. In case of n periods and n firms this would require the solution of many games with
different exogenously given orderings of moves from which many of these have multiple
decision periods with at least two firms moving simultaneously. Solving, for example, the
game with an exogenously given ordering of moves in which two firms move in the first
period and two in the second period in case of four firms, seems to be a challenging
problem. However, we plan to work on this question in future research and we believe that
partial results can be achieved.
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